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Chapter 3
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALISA-
TION ON WESTERN EUROPEAN
JOBS: CURSE OR BLESSING?
1. Introduction*
Much of the Western European debate on globalisa-
tion has focused on the risk that increased competi-
tion from foreign workers with low wages will cause
job losses. This could occur because of import com-
petition, offshoring of production or labour immi-
gration. The fears in the public debate stand in stark
contrast to the attitudes of most economists, who
tend instead to stress the long-run welfare gains from
increased international integration. These accrue
because trade allows specialisation in production.
According to “old” trade theory, the basis is com-
parative advantages based on differences in endow-
ments of production factors or in technology.
According to “new” trade theory, specialisation is
instead based on economies of scale. Alternatively,
mobility of production factors allows them to be
used more efficiently.
Traditional theory more or less defined away the risk
that the opening up of trade could lead to unemploy-
ment. The standard assumption has been that flexible
prices and wages guarantee full employment in the
long run. This can be seen as a shortcut to capture the
notion that equilibrium unemployment, that is the
average unemployment over the business cycle, is
mainly determined by labour market institutions and
is not to any large extent affected by the volume of
trade.
However, the sanguine attitude of traditional theory
towards the employment effects of increased trade
with low-wage economies has also been challenged. It
has become a standard argument that unemployment
will arise to the extent that wage rigidities prevent
wages and prices from adjusting to changed trade pat-
terns. This has been claimed to be a contributing fac-
tor to the high unemployment, especially among low-
skilled workers, in many European countries.
According to this argument, the fall in demand for
low-skilled labour associated with competition from
low-wage economies has caused the relative wage of
this group to fall in the US and other Anglo-Saxon
countries, whereas the effect on the relative wage has
in contrast been marginal in most of Western Europe
with the consequence that employment has instead
fallen.
It is true, of course, that if globalisation leads to a fall
in demand for labour as a whole or for certain types
of labour in advanced economies, employment will
suffer in the presence of rigidities that prevent down-
ward wage adjustments. But to gauge the long-run
effects, it is crucial to analyse how the wage rigidities
themselves may change in response to globalisation.
This chapter argues that globalisation in itself tends
to weaken these rigidities. It is possible that globalisa-
tion could promote labour market flexibility to such
an extent that employment rises in the long run. If so,
globalisation will not be a curse for employment in
Western Europe; it could instead turn out to be a
blessing.
Possible positive employment effects do not imply
that economic policy-makers should not respond to
globalisation pressures. To the extent that positive
employment effects come about, it may be because
globalisation raises wage inequality and shifts the
functional income distribution in favour of capital.
So, an important task of economic policy is to try to
allocate the gains from globalisation in a “fair way”
and ensure that groups that might otherwise lose out
(or receive only small gains) also share the benefits. It
may be this, rather than preventing employment loss-
es, that is the main challenge to economic policy from
globalisation. But if so, redistribution policies must
be pursued in such a way that they support – and do
not counteract – the general objective of raising
employment. This speaks strongly against policies
such as rises in unemployment benefits and the impo-
sition of minimum wages. Measures such as retraining
schemes, government support to displaced workers
* We are grateful to Karolina Ekholm and Harry Flam for com-
ments on an earlier version of this chapter and to Jaan Köll for sup-
plying data on FDI.through severance pay, wage insurance and employ-
ment tax credits are more promising but should be
pursued with caution.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 gives
a brief overview of globalisation trends. Section 3
summarises the theoretical arguments for why glob-
alisation may cause unemployment in the presence
of wage rigidities. Section 4 identifies possible
mechanisms through which globalisation might
loosen these wage rigidities and instead be benefi-
cial for employment. Section 5 surveys existing
research on the effects of globalisation on the rela-
tive demand for low-skilled versus high-skilled
labour in advanced economies. Section 6 focuses
instead on the effects of globalisation on overall
labour demand and employment: the section both
reviews existing research and adds new empirical
evidence. Finally, Section 7 discusses appropriate
policies to deal with the labour market effects of
globalisation.
2. Globalisation trends – an empirical overview
Global market integration takes place via three chan-
nels: (1) trade in goods and services, (2) capital mobil-
ity and (3) labour mobility.
2.1 Trade integration
Figure 3.1 displays trade-to-GDP ratios (exports +
imports as percentages of GDP) for OECD and EU15
countries since 1960.1 These numbers are averages of
trade ratios at the individual country level and there-
fore reflect trade flows within the
EU15 and the OECD as well as
between these areas and the rest
of the world. There have been
strong upward trends for both
areas. The main explanation of
the lower figure for the OECD is
the large influence of the US,
which as a large country is natu-
rally characterised by a low
trade-to-GDP ratio. While for
the EU15 as a whole total trade
as a percentage of GDP increased from 39 to 74 per-
cent between 1960 and 2005, the ratio for the OECD
increased from 20 to 48 percent. The trade expansion
over the last fifteen years has been much faster than
over the preceding fifteen years.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of trade developments
country by country. As can be seen, the trade expan-
sion has been a universal phenomenon, encompassing
all the countries shown.
The globalisation debate in advanced economies has
focused on the increased trade with low-wage coun-
tries in particular. To illustrate this, we show trade
with non-OECD countries excluding OPEC members
in Figure 3.2. As can be seen, the trade with low-wage
economies as a percentage of GDP is still small,
8–9 percent for both EU15 and the whole OECD
area. But the trade ratios have been increasing at a
rapid pace since the late 1980s.
Table 3.2 shows imports from low-wage countries as a
percentage of GDP for individual OECD countries.
The dependence on low-wage imports has increased
for all countries except Norway. In Europe, the in-
creases in imports were particularly large in the
Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Finland.
Although trade with low-wage economies only makes
up a small fraction of the total trade of advanced
economies, these trade flows have grown much faster
than overall trade. Figure 3.3 shows that the share of
imports from low-wage economies in total imports
increased from 13 to 19 percent for the EU15 between




1 The calculations have been done by
weighting country-specific trade-to-GDP
ratios by the countries’ shares in aggregate
GDP for the whole area. The OECD
aggregate does not include the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico,
Poland, Slovakia and Turkey, as we want
to focus on high-income countries.EEAG Report 73
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approached 29 percent in 2004, reflecting mainly the
larger share of imports from non-OECD countries in
total imports in Japan and the US than in Western
European countries. This can be seen in Table 3.3.
Among the low-wage countries, China stands out as it
has integrated into the world economy at a particu-
larly high pace. According to the United Nations’
COMTRADE data, the share of OECD imports
from China in total imports from
outside the OECD jumped from
0.7 percent in 1980 to nearly 10
percent in 2005.2
Through improvements in com-
munication and transport tech-
nology, firms are now better able
than before to manage complex
production processes around the
globe such that parts of the value
added chain can be moved
abroad. This phenomenon has
attracted a lot of attention in the
trade literature as well as in the
public debate since the 1990s.
The concept of international out-
sourcing and offshoring are wide-
ly used to characterise this
process. The terminology varies,
however. International outsourc-
ing is sometimes defined as a
firm’s imports of intermediary
inputs from foreign non-affiliat-
ed production locations and off-
shoring as a firm’s imports of in-
termediary inputs from foreign
in-house production locations. Unless stated other-
wise, we shall here let international outsourcing
denote the imports of intermediary inputs from
abroad in general independently of whether the
source is an affiliated or a non-affiliated production
location. Offshoring will denote imports from an
affiliated production location only. Figures 3.4a and
3.4b show that the share of intermediate imports in
total output increased for most countries between
1995 and 2000. This is true for
both materials and services.
2.2 Capital mobility
Capital mobility is another
important channel for interna-
tional market integration. We
focus first on foreign direct
investment (FDI), which can be
divided into horizontal and verti-
cal FDI. While the former takes
place mainly between countries




1960 1980 2000 2005
Austria 48 74 92 101
Belgium 78 119 169 172
Denmark 63 66 82 93
Finland 44 66 76 74
France 26 43 56 53
Germany 52 67 75
Greece 24 51 58 49
Ireland 65 106 176 151
b)
Italy 26 46 56 52
Luxembourg 177 196 291 294
Netherlands 92 104 130 134
Portugal 36 60 75 66
Spain 15 32 62 56
Sweden 45 60 89 90
UK 42 52 58 56
EU15 39 55 71 74
Australia 29 33 46 40
b)
Canada 55 87 73
b)
Japan 21 28 20 24
Korea 16 73 87 83
New Zealand 60 72 59
Norway 73 80 77 73
Switzerland 53 73 88 85
b)
US 10 21 26 25
b)
OECD 20 40 44 48
Note: 
a) See Figure 3.1. – 
b)The figure refers to 2004.
Source: World Development Indicators.
Figure 3.2
2 See Figure 3.2 in OECD (2007).and serves to access foreign markets by moving pro-
duction closer to consumers, firms to a large extent
engage in vertical foreign direct investments to
exploit the advantage of low wages in emerging
economies in the production of labour-intensive
intermediate goods. Figure 3.5 and Table 3.4 show a
dramatic increase in FDI from advanced countries.
For the EU15 the ratio of total outward FDI stock to
domestic GDP jumped from 6 to 40 percent between
1980 and 2005.3 The OECD figure reached 27 percent
in 2005. Among individual coun-
tries, the Netherlands stand out
as their ratio more than quadru-
pled from 24 percent to more
than 100 percent between 1980
and 2005; larger countries like
the US or Japan show much
smaller increases.
Distinguishing again between
advanced and low-wage coun-
tries, one finds a similar pattern
as with international trade.
Low-wage economies only play








Belgium 5.7 10.6 10.5
Denmark 2.4 3.4 4.0
Finland 3.3 6.3 7.9
France 2.4 3.6 3.7
Germany 2.9 4.4 4.7
Greece 2.8 4.6 4.9
Ireland 2.0 7.1 5.2
Italy 2.5 3.9 4.1
Netherlands 5.6 8.7 11.1
Portugal 3.4 3.2 3.3
Spain 2.0 4.1 4.3
Sweden 1.9 3.3 3.4
UK 2.6 4.3 4.4
EU15 2.7 4.5 4.9
Australia 2.3 5.4 6.2
Canada 1.5 3.4 4.1
Japan 2.4 3.4 4.6
Korea 0.0 10.9 12.1
New Zealand 2.8 5.7 6.2
Norway 3.6 3.1 3.2
Switzerland 2.4 3.6 2.5
US 2.2 3.8 4.4
OECD 2.4 4.1 4.8
Note: See Figure 3.2.
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database. 
Figure 3.3
3 The percentages in Figure 3.5 have been
calculated in a similar way as in Figu-
re 3.1. See footnote 1.
Table 3.3 
Imports from low-wage countries as a 
percentage of total imports
1990 2000 2004
Austria 9.4 11.0
Belgium 9.4 14.1 13.1
Denmark 9.7 12.3 14.6
Finland 16.4 22.4 29.2
France 12.4 15.5 17.7
Germany 13.8 16.6 18.2
Greece 11.8 17.1 19.5
Ireland 4.5 13.4 15.3
Italy 15.4 17.5 20.0
Netherlands 12.2 18.3 26.1
Portugal 9.5 8.6 10.6
Spain 11.5 14.9 17.2
Sweden 8.3 10.2 11.9
UK 11.6 18.1 20.6
EU15 12.4 16.2 18.7
Australia 18.4 31.0 37.6
Canada 7.4 10.0 14.6
Japan 31.8 42.2 46.6
Korea 0.0 31.3 36.7
New Zealand 13.0 21.0 26.8
Norway 15.3 14.7 16.9
Switzerland 7.9 10.3 8.3
US 24.4 29.8 33.7
OECD 19.6 27.0 28.8
Note: See Figure 3.2.
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database.EEAG Report 75
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FDI from advanced economies
(see Table 3.5). Relative to the
GDP of advanced countries,
outward FDI stock in low-wage
economies made up no more
than a small percentage in 2000
if one excludes outliers such as
Switzerland and the Nether-
lands. For most advanced coun-
tries, the share of low-wage
economies in total outward FDI
stock is below 15 percent (the
exceptions are Austria with
38.9 percent, the US with
31.1 percent, Canada with
25.2 percent and Switzerland
with 22.3 percent). It is notewor-
thy, however, that the share of
the outward FDI stock in low-
wage economies rose for most
advanced economies between
1995 and 2000.
Although the amount of FDI
can be used as an indicator of
capital market integration, the
measure says nothing about the
extent to which the world capital
stock has been reallocated from
advanced to low-wage econo-
mies. Ideally, one would like to
see how the distribution of the
world capital stock has changed
over recent decades. Capital
stock data, especially in low-
wage economies, are, however,
notoriously unreliable.
It is clear though that the alloca-
tion of investment has changed
substantially over time. Figu-
re 3.6a shows that low-wage eco-
nomies still account for less than
30 percent of total global capital
formation, but this fraction in-
creased by more than 10 percent-
age points between 1970 and
2005. As can be seen in Figu-
re 3.6b, the rising share of low-
wage economies in world invest-
ment can to a large extent be




Figure 3.52.3 Labour mobility
Migration of labour represents a third channel of
globalisation. Table 3.6 shows the stocks of foreign-
born population as a percentage of total population
in various countries. The table gives a picture of
increases everywhere. The largest
shares of foreign-born popula-
tion in Europe are in Switzerland
(23.8 percent) and Austria
(13.5 percent), which are coun-
tries that have always relied on
large inflows of foreign labour.
But it is also to be noted that the
percentages of foreign-born pop-
ulation in Germany (12.9),
Sweden (12.4) and Belgium
(12.1) more or less match that of
the US (12.9), a traditional im-
migration country. 
Table 3.7 shows instead gross
yearly inflows of foreign citizens
as a percentage of total popula-
tion. The EU15 average in 2005
was 0.7 percent. The European
countries that stand out with the
largest inflows are Spain (1.6 per-
cent), Switzerland (1.3 percent),
Austria (1.2 percent) and Ireland
(1.2 percent). Here, too, there is
an increasing trend for most
countries.
3. Globalisation and unemployment
The standard framework of economists to analyse
the effects of trade integration with low-wage
economies is the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin model of
trade. In the simplest versions of
the model, the basic assumptions
are that there are two production
factors, two goods with different
relative factor requirements in
production and two regions with
different relative factor endow-
ments. Sometimes capital and
labour are seen as the two pro-
duction factors, with advanced
countries having a larger stock of
capital relative to labour than
low-wage economies. Sometimes
the focus is instead on high-
skilled and low-skilled labour as
the two factors of production,
with a larger relative supply of
high-skilled labour (human capi-




Outward FDI stock as a percentage of domestic GDP
1980 1990 2000 2005
Austria 0.7 2.9 12.8 21.9
Belgium and Luxembourg 4.8 19.4 72.5
Denmark 3.0 5.5 46.2 45.5
Finland 1.4 8.2 43.5 38.5
France 3.5 9.0 33.5 40.5
Germany 4.8 9.1 29.0 34.6
Greece 3.4 5.4 6.0
Ireland 36.4 29.4 59.0
Italy 1.6 5.5 16.8 16.6
Netherlands 23.6 36.3 82.4 102.6
Portugal 1.7 1.3 18.4 24.2
Spain 0.8 3.0 28.9 33.8
Sweden 2.8 21.1 51.4 56.5
UK 15.0 23.2 62.4 56.2
EU15 6.0 11.7 38.2 39.9
Australia 3.0 9.8 22.0 22.5
Canada 8.9 14.8 33.3 35.3
Japan 1.8 6.6 5.9 8.5
Korea 0.2 0.9 5.2 4.6
New Zealand 2.3 14.7 16.3 10.2
Norway 0.9 9.4 217.2 123.3
Switzerland 19.4 28.0 93.4 107.4
United States 7.8 7.5 13.5 16.4
OECD 6.2 9.5 22.6 26.8
Note: The aggregate figures are weighted country-specific figures as
explained in footnote 1.
Source: UNCTAD FDI Database.
Table 3.5 





1995 2000 1995 2000
Austria 1.7 4.9 34.1 38.9
Finland 0.8 2.6 7.3 6.1
France 0.5 1.9 4.3 5.6
Germany 1.4 4.0 13.3 14.3
Italy 0.3 0.6 4.0 4.2
Netherlands 6.6 11.5 16.5 14.7
Sweden 0.5 4.9 1.9 9.5
UK 4.9 5.3 17.8 8.3
Australia 2.1 2.4 14.9 10.5
Canada 4.0 8.4 20.0 25.2
Norway 1.7 3.9 10.9 15.3
Switzerland 9.0 20.5 20.4 22.3
US 2.7 4.2 29.1 31.1
Note: See Figure 3.2.
Source: UNCTAD FDI Database.EEAG Report 77
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wage economies. Below we will denote the sector
using capital/skilled labour more intensively the capi-
tal-intensive sector and the other sector the labour-
intensive one.
In the absence of trade, relative goods prices differ
between advanced economies (the North) and low-
wage economies (the South): the relative price of the
capital-intensive good is lower in the North than in
the South. The opening up of trade between the two
regions equalises goods prices: the relative price of
the capital-intensive good increases in the North,
whereas the reverse development occurs in the South.
In the North, there is an incentive to move produc-
tion factors to the capital-intensive sector. Hence,
output in this section expands, whereas output in the
labour-intensive sector contracts. In the South, the
reverse development takes place.
As a result, the North will export
the capital-intensive good and
import the labour-intensive
good. In the North, there is an
increase in the relative demand
for the production factor used
intensively in the expanding sec-
tor: capital or skilled labour. The
explanation is that more addi-
tional capital (or skilled labour)
is demanded from the expanding
capital-intensive sector than is
released from the contracting
labour-intensive sector, at the
same time as the increase in
demand for the other production
factor from the expanding sector
is smaller than the fall in demand
in the contracting sector. If fac-
tor supplies are given and mar-
kets clear – as is assumed in tra-
ditional trade models – the rela-
tive reward of the factor used
intensively in the expanding sec-
tor must rise: the return to capi-
tal rises relative to the wage or
the relative wage of skilled
labour rises. Reverse develop-
ments occur in the South. The
changes in the relative factor
price are larger than the changes
in the relative price. The associa-
tion between an increase (de-
crease) in the relative price of a
good and the increase (decrease)
in the relative reward for the factor used intensively in
the production of that good is usually labelled the
Stolper-Samuelson effect. 
Overall, the expansion of trade results in welfare
gains for both regions because production factors can
be used more efficiently when each region can expand
the production in which it has a comparative advan-
tage due to the differences in factor endowments. But
the convergence of factor prices between the North
and the South also implies changes in the income dis-
tribution. Although the opening up of trade creates
aggregate gains in both regions, there are, according
to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, both winners and
losers. The existence of aggregate gains means, how-
ever, that in principle the winners can compensate the
losers by means of monetary transfers, so that all
Figure 3.6a
Figure 3.6bagents in a region can be made better off than if it had
remained in autarky.
While the Heckscher-Ohlin
framework focuses on trade as
the explanation of factor price
convergence, capital and labour
movements have similar effects.
When it can, capital moves from
high-wage to low-wage countries,
decreasing labour demand in the
former and increasing it in the
latter. Labour, in turn, migrates
from low-wage to high-wage
countries, increasing labour sup-
ply there and reducing it in the
low-wage countries.
The Heckscher-Ohlin story has
been invoked as an explanation
of both rising wage inequality
and a falling labour share in
advanced economies. Figure 3.7
shows how the relative earnings
of high-skilled versus low-skilled
labour – measured as the ratio
between the earnings of the 90th
and the 10th percentile of the
earnings distribution – have increased strongly in the
US and the UK over the last decades. There have also
been increases – although smaller – in Germany, the
Netherlands and Sweden. The two exceptions to this
pattern in the diagram are Finland and France: in
Finland the wage gap has remained more or less
unchanged, whereas it has narrowed somewhat in
France. Figure 3.8 shows how the aggregate income
shares of labour and of employees in advanced
economies have declined since 1980.
3.1 Trade and rigid wages
It has become a standard reasoning that globalisation
causes unemployment in Western Europe because
rigidities prevent wages from adjusting. The argument
was first developed by Krugman (1995) on the basis
of earlier work by Brecher (1974). More recent exam-
ples include, for example, Davis (1998), Landmann
and Pflüger (1998), Sinn (2003, 2005a, 2006), EEAG
(2005), Calmfors (2006) and Seidel (2007).
Krugman’s argument was developed within the
Heckscher-Ohlin framework described above. He
focused on low-skilled versus high-skilled labour. The
argument is simply that if the fall in relative demand
for unskilled labour in the North is not allowed to




Stock of foreign-born population as a 
percentage of total population
1996 2000 2005
Austria  10.5  13.5
Belgium  9.8  10.3  12.1
Denmark  5.1  5.8  6.5
Finland  2.1  2.6  3.4
France  7.3
a)




Ireland  6.9  8.7  11.0
Italy 2.5
b)
Netherlands  9.2  10.1  10.6
Norway  5.6  6.8  8.2
Portugal  5.4  5.1  6.3
Spain  5.3
b)
Sweden  10.7  11.3  12.4
Switzerland  21.3  21.9  23.8
UK  7.1  7.9  9.7
Australia  23.3  23.0  23.8
Canada  17.4  18.1  19.1
New Zealand  16.2  17.2  19.4
US  10.3  11.0  12.9
Notes: 
a) 2003. – 
b) 2001.
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 
2007.
Table 3.7 
Gross inflow of foreign citizens as a percentage
of total population
1992 1996 2000 2005
Austria 0.8 1.2
Belgium 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7
Denmark 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3
Finland 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
France 0.1 0.2 0.2
Germany 1.5 0.9 0.8 0.7
Ireland 0.6 0.7 1.2
Italy 0.5 0.5
Netherlands 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Portugal 0.0 0.2 0.3
Spain 0.8 1.6
Sweden 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6
UK 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8
EU15 0.5 0.7
Australia 0.6 1.3 1.8 2.2
Canada 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.6
Japan 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
New Zealand 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.3
Norway 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7
Switzerland 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.3
US 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.8
OECD 0.6 0.7
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2007.EEAG Report 79
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ployment of unskilled workers must emerge. Because
of this, the opening up of trade does not result in
overall welfare gains for the North; instead welfare
falls as compared to the pre-trade situation.
The lack of downward relative wage adjustment for
unskilled workers could be the consequence of sever-
al types of rigidities. It could be the relative wage itself
that is rigid. It could be the real wage in terms of the
CPI (or any other combination of the prices of the
two goods in the model) that is rigid. Or it could be
the  money wage that is rigid downwards (provided
there is no or only very low inflation). 
If the North is large enough, the rigid relative wage
there locks the world relative price after trade has
opened at the pre-trade level in
the North. This means a larger
expansion of the output of the
labour-intensive good in the
South than if wages were flexible.
The North cuts down more on
the production of labour-inten-
sive goods than in the flexible-
wage case, at the same time as it
expands the production of the
skill-intensive good more.4 Both
the North’s exports of the skill-
intensive good and its imports of
the labour-intensive good will be
larger than if wages were flexible.
The wage rigidity thus causes
both overspecialisation and over-
expansion of trade.
With flexible wages, the North also specialises in the
skill-intensive good, but less so because declining
wages for the unskilled keep a larger fraction of the
labour-intensive sector alive. With a rigid relative
wage, too large a part of the labour-intensive sector is
lost, and too much skilled labour is driven into the
skill-intensive sector, where, however, the unskilled set
free cannot be fully reemployed. The upshot is that
exports from a skill-abundant country with rigid
wages need not be a sign of high competitiveness.
Instead, it might just reflect a “pathological export
boom” enabled by an overly large shrinkage of the
labour-intensive sector.5
According to the Krugman argument, globalisation
may have caused more wage
inequality in the US and other
Anglo-Saxon countries, where
wages are flexible, but unemploy-
ment in European economies,
where wages are rigid. A similar
argument can be made for labour
in general if one thinks instead in
terms of the North and the
South having different relative
endowments of capital and
Figure 3.7
Figure 3.8
4 This is an application of the so-called
Rybczinsky theorem. According to that, a
fall in the employment of a production
factor causes a reduction in the output of
the good that is intensive in the use of this
factor and an increase in the output of the
other good.
5 For an extensive analysis see Sinn (2005a,
2006). The overexpansion of trade was
first mentioned by Srinivasan (1995) in a
comment to Krugman (1995).labour. With an abundance of capital relative to
labour in the North, trade then implies specialisation
there in capital-intensive goods and a fall in the over-
all demand for labour. With downward real wage
rigidity or money wage rigidity (in the case of very
low inflation), an analogous reasoning to that above
implies an increase in unemployment of all categories
of workers.6
The risk that globalisation would cause unemploy-
ment because of wage rigidities obviously depends on
the specific form of wage rigidity and on the speed
with which trade integration occurs. If it is the real
wage that is rigid downwards, risks are reduced to the
extent that there is ongoing productivity growth that
tends to raise the demand for labour: a relative shift
in factor demand from labour to capital does not
then have to involve any cut in real wages, to which
there may be strong resistance.7 If the downward
rigidity refers to nominal wages, the risk that this
rigidity will bite is smaller not only to the extent that
productivity growth is higher but also the higher is
inflation, since both higher productivity growth and
higher inflation imply higher nominal wage growth.
Conversely, a slowing of productivity growth, as has
occurred in many European countries in recent years
(see Chapter 3 in EEAG 2006), might exacerbate the
problems. In general, the risks that either real or
nominal wage rigidity will bite are smaller, the slower
the pace of trade integration. Relative wage rigidity is
a much larger problem than real wage rigidity: if
labour demand shifts from low-skilled to high-skilled
labour because of trade integration at the same time
as there is general (factor-neutral) productivity
growth, the latter cannot prevent unemployment
from arising among the low-skilled if their wages
increase to the same extent as the wages of the high-
skilled.
3.2 Capital movements and unemployment
As discussed above, trade and factor mobility can be
substitutes for each other. So, it is not surprising that
the argument of globalisation causing unemployment
under wage rigidities could just as well be phrased in
terms of capital movements (see EEAG 2005; Seidel
2005, 2007; or Calmfors 2006).
Think about two economies (again the North and the
South) with different capital-labour ratios. The two
regions produce the same internationally traded good.
The return to capital is lower in the capital-abundant
North than in the labour-abundant South, whereas
the reverse applies to the real wage. Opening up for
free capital movements leads to a reallocation of the
world capital stock in the long run, so that the returns
to capital are equalised between the two regions by
capital flows from the North to the South. In the
process, labour demand falls in the North. With flexi-
ble wages, the result of capital reallocation and the
fall in labour demand in the North is a reduction in
the real wage there. There is, however, an overall
income gain for the region because the gain to capital
owners of higher returns outweighs the wage losses
for labour.8
But if there is instead downward wage rigidity, unem-
ployment emerges in the North. This prevents an
increase in the return to capital there. If the North is
large enough, its fixed real wage locks the factor
returns in the world economy to the pre-capital-
mobility levels in the North. This can only happen
with a larger outflow of capital to the South than with
wage flexibility, raising the marginal product of
labour, and thus the real wage, more in that region
than in the flexible-wage case. So, in this model frame-
work, wage rigidity in the North again causes larger
structural changes than would otherwise be the case.
And again the wage rigidity implies that the potential
aggregate income gains in the North never materialise.
Instead, globalisation reduces aggregate income in
this region: the income of capital owners remains
unchanged, whereas total labour income falls when
employment falls. 
The above reasoning is, of course, too simplistic
because it assumes that the wage does not respond to
the unemployment emerging during the globalisation
process. This is at odds with received wage-setting the-
ory, which usually posits a wage-setting relationship
according to which the wage is sensitive to the level of
unemployment (see, for example, EEAG 2004, 2005).
Taking this into account, one should expect the unem-
ployment emerging in the process to gradually exert
some moderating influence on wages. This will in turn
reduce the rise in unemployment, but the main con-
clusion remains that with imperfectly flexible wages
the shifts in labour demand associated with globalisa-




6 It is more far-fetched to think of a rigid relative wage in terms of
the return to capital
7 Such downward real wage rigidity has been documented by, for
example, Dickens (2005) and Holden and Wulfsberg (2007).
8 The implication is thus that, relative to a counterfactual where cap-
ital cannot move and everything else is held equal, the region’s Gross
National Income (GNI) rises, while its Gross National Product falls
as capital is being relocated elsewhere.EEAG Report 81
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3.3 Unemployment and labour migration
Immigration has similar implications for factor price
convergence as trade specialisation and capital move-
ments, because people migrate from low-wage to
high-wage countries, increasing the scarcity price of
labour in the former and reducing it in the latter.
Ideally, also such factor movements create aggregate
welfare gains for all nations involved. The nation
from where labour emigrates gains because its work-
ers obtain higher wages in the host country than what
they were able to contribute to GDP at home. The
nation to where the workers immigrate gains, because
the immigrants typically make a contribution to
GDP that is higher than the wage they receive, since
part of that contribution accrues to complementary
factors such as capital. 
Also immigration can significantly change the
income distribution. Those who offer labour services
that are complements to what the immigrants offer
gain, but those who offer substitute services lose.
However, the losses are not aggregate losses, as they
are counterbalanced by gains elsewhere in the econo-
my. The lower the wages of domestic substitute work-
ers fall, the larger are the gains for those who buy
their services.
Again wage rigidities and unemployment in the host
country modify the analysis substantially. If wages do
not fall despite immigration, employers have no incen-
tive to create additional jobs, and the immigration
hence causes unemployment. If wage rigidities and
unemployment stem from high union wages or legally
imposed minimum wages, the immigrants may be able
to get some of the jobs, crowding out nationals to the
extent they succeed. However, as their chances of tak-
ing over the jobs of nationals are limited, migration
itself will be limited. 
If wage rigidities and unemployment instead stem
from high welfare replacement payments that are not
dependent on wages, the wage replacement payments
act as minimum wages for domestic residents, but
not for the immigrants, as the latter typically are not
eligible to these benefits before they have worked.
Then, as shown in Sinn (2005b), immigrants are like-
ly to underbid domestic residents in the labour mar-
ket and crowd out domestic residents from jobs to a
very large extent. As domestic residents – whose re-
servation wages are higher because of the possibility
of receiving welfare – remain the marginal suppliers
in the labour market, they continue to determine the
market-clearing wage and prevent the creation of
additional jobs. Immigration will then cause unem-
ployment among domestic residents, but this unem-
ployment will not discourage immigration.
3.4 Unemployment and increased “turbulence”
Another important channel through which globalisa-
tion could increase unemployment is through faster
structural change (“increased turbulence”). It is a
common view that the pace of structural transforma-
tion has increased over time and that globalisation in
all its forms is an important explanation, even if there
is no consensus on this.9 Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2006) have emphasised how such increased turbu-
lence could result in higher unemployment. They
associate faster structural change with a more rapid
loss of human capital (skills needed in new jobs)
among the unemployed. This reduces the wage they
could get on a new job and hence raises the effective
replacement rate of unemployment insurance (the
ratio of unemployment benefits to the wage on a new
job) if unemployment benefits are tied to earlier
wages, as is the case in most countries. The conse-
quence is that unemployed workers’ reservation
wages become very high, which reduces job creation
and hence raises unemployment. This may in partic-
ular be the case with stringent employment protec-
tion regulation, the costs of which will not be shifted
back on to employees if effective replacement rates
are high.
4. Six arguments why globalisation could be good
for Western European employment 
The preceding section has set out the arguments for
why globalisation in conjunction with labour market
rigidities may cause unemployment in Western
Europe. This will certainly be the case to the extent
that an unchanged employment level requires wage
adjustments that are not allowed to take place.
Unemployment then substitutes for wage reductions
as an adjustment mechanism. However, one should
not take the amount of wage rigidity as given.
Instead, the extent of trade integration and interna-
tional factor mobility may be important determi-
nants of the degree of labour market rigidity, partic-
ularly in the long run. So, a crucial question is to
what degree globalisation could help relax labour
9 See the short summary of empirical evidence in Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2006). See also Blanchard (2006), OECD (2007) and WTO-
ILO (2007).market rigidities and in this way mitigate adverse
employment effects or possibly even contribute to
higher employment.
This section analyses several mechanisms through
which globalisation might in fact promote high
employment by reducing market imperfections. These
mechanisms include:
1. Scale effects due to the cost savings associated with
international outsourcing
2. Lower price mark-ups because of stronger inter-
national competition
3. Increased sensitivity of labour demand to wages
4. A stronger bargaining position of employers vis-à-
vis unions
5. Institutional changes in the labour market
6. Terms-of-trade gains for advanced economies
4.1 Cost-saving effects of international outsourcing
As discussed in Section 2.1, a prominent feature of
globalisation is the strong trend towards outsourcing
production to low-wage economies. Initially, the
debate on international outsourcing mainly empha-
sised the potential threat to employment in advanced
economies from the substitution of imports of inter-
mediary products for domestic labour. But recently,
the discussion has come to focus more on the cost-
saving and productivity-increasing effects of out-
sourcing.
Work by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a,b)
has emphasised how the production process can be
seen as a set of tasks performed by workers. Inter-
national outsourcing represents trade in such tasks, of
which some are more easily tradable than others.10
Improvements in both physical transportation and
electronic communication have reduced the costs of
outsourcing tasks. When more tasks are outsourced
abroad, foreign labour is substituted for domestic
labour. This effect tends to reduce domestic labour
demand. But at the same time, the possibility to out-
source tasks allows firms to deepen the division of
labour; the associated cost savings imply a positive
scale effect raising the demand for local labour to per-
form the tasks that are less suitable to outsource
abroad. The outsourcing of tasks therefore affects
labour demand in a similar way as labour-augmenting
technological progress.
If one embeds this analysis in a standard Hechscher-
Ohlin trade framework, it is no longer clear that out-
sourcing of tasks must reduce domestic labour
demand.11 On the one hand, the efficiency gain from
outsourcing labour services causes an increase in the
relative supply of the labour-intensive good, which
depresses its relative price. This tends to reduce
labour demand in the domestic economy in the way
discussed above. But on the other hand, the net “pro-
ductivity” effect of outsourcing tends to raise labour
demand.12
If one takes the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg analy-
sis at face value, it leads to the important policy con-
clusion that it is counter productive for a single coun-
try – like Belgium or even France or Germany – to try
to protect employment through national measures to
restrict international outsourcing of tasks. If this is
done by a country in isolation, it has only a marginal
effect on the prices of goods traded in the world mar-
ket as long as other advanced countries continue to
outsource. The main effect is instead to eliminate the
cost-savings effect which exerts a positive influence on
domestic employment.13
Empirical knowledge on the cost-saving effects of
both international outsourcing and outsourcing in
general is still scant. Görzig and Stephan (2002) found
that outsourcing of materials is positively correlated
with profits for German manufacturing firms, where-
as the relationship appears to be negative for services.
Kimura (2002) did not find any evidence of positive
profit effects of outsourcing in Japanese manufactur-
ing firms. A study of outsourcing in electronics sub-
sectors in Ireland by Görg and Hanley (2004) found
that large firms benefit from the outsourcing of both
material and service inputs, while this is not the case
for small plants. A likely explanation of these differ-
ences is that transactions costs are smaller for large
than for small plants. Amiti and Wei (2005b) studied
international outsourcing in US manufacturing firms
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10 See also Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b), Levy and Murnane
(2004) or Feenstra (2007).
11 See the introduction to Section 3 and Section 3.1. Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg focus their analysis on high-skilled and low-skilled
labour, but the analysis can just as well be recast in terms of capital
and labour.
12 A similar cost-saving effect, tending to raise employment, has been
analysed by Mitra and Ranjan (2007) in a model where unemploy-
ment arises because of search frictions.
13 The sharp conclusions from the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model
derive from the equality of the number of production factors and the
number of goods. With more production factors than goods, there
would also be an additional “labour supply effect”from outsourcing,
reducing the wage that would equate labour demand and supply in
the same way as if there had been an increase in domestic labour sup-
ply. In general, one could not tell whether or not this labour supply
effect outweighs the productivity effect for a single economy. How-
ever, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a,b) argue that this has
been the case for the US.EEAG Report 83
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and concluded that more than ten percent of produc-
tivity growth over the 1995–2001 period could be
attributed to such outsourcing of services and anoth-
er five percent to the outsourcing of material inputs.
On the basis of a back-of-the-envelope calculation,
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a) argued that
the cost-savings effect they emphasise in their theoret-
ical analysis was an important factor behind the
increase in US wages between 1998 and 2004. 
Although it is still an open question to what extent
international outsourcing results in cost savings, the
basic hypothesis must be that rational firms engage in
it because it is profitable.
A wider question is whether international trade in
general, including final goods, raises productivity
growth. One would expect this to be the case, as
more competition is likely to raise the incentives for
efficiency improvements. A common result in
empirical growth studies is also that larger trade
openness is associated with higher growth.14 Recent
theoretical research has emphasised that falling
trade costs are likely to raise within-sector produc-
tivity growth because larger export opportunities
stimulate the entry of new firms and in this way
“drive down the ex post profitability of producers,
and therefore push up the minimum level of pro-
ductivity firms need in order to survive”.15 This
leads to relative growth of high-productivity firms
within industries.16 It is theoretically possible that
these productivity gains are large enough to ensure
that real wage gains are consistent with full employ-
ment also for production factors that are used
intensively in comparative-disadvantage sectors
(such as unskilled labour).17
The conclusion is that the cost-saving effects of inter-
national outsourcing and trade might reduce signifi-
cantly the risk that trade with low-wage economies in
combination with wage rigidities will cause unem-
ployment. The evaluation depends to a large extent on
the type of wage rigidity. If downward rigidity of the
real or the nominal wage is the problem, the probabil-
ity that such rigidities bite is lowered.18 It may very
well be that productivity growth is high enough that
all  real (and nominal) wages can increase without
causing unemployment, even though the relative wage
of low-skilled may have to fall.19 But to the extent that
relative wage rigidity is a binding constraint and that
international outsourcing contributes to general cost
savings for all types of labour, rather than primarily
for unskilled labour, the unemployment risks associat-
ed with globalisation are larger.
4.2 Lower price mark-ups because of increased
competitive pressures
Another positive employment effect of globalisation
could arise because increased trade in general, includ-
ing trade with low-wage economies, implies stronger
competitive pressures in the markets for products and
services. More exactly, stronger competition raises
product demand elasticities, that is the sensitivity of
product demand to price changes. Basic price theory
teaches that firms with market power restrict output
and employment by raising prices above marginal
costs. Price mark-ups are higher the lower are product
demand elasticities. Hence, to the extent that stronger
international competition raises product demand
elasticities, firms are forced to reduce their price
mark-ups. This tends to increase the demand for out-
put and thus also the labour demanded by producers.
One can think of the effect as an outward shift of the
labour demand schedule, which tends to raise both
employment and the real wage: an increase in nominal
wages relative to prices, that is an increase in the real
wage, is the flip side of a reduction in prices relative to
nominal wages.20
There exists a large empirical literature trying to
explain differences in unemployment in panel data
for OECD countries (that is to explain variation
both across countries and within countries over
time) by differences in labour market institutions in
a wide sense: generosity of unemployment benefits,
union density, coverage of collective agreements, the
degree of coordination of wage bargaining and tax
wedges.21 It has become increasingly common to add
variables capturing the extent of product market reg-
ulation to such regressions including labour market
14 A frequently quoted study is Frankel and Rose (2000). See also
Frankel and Romer (1996) and OECD (2005).
15 Bernard et al. (2007).
16 Bernard and Jensen (2004) found that a very substantial part of
productivity growth in US manufacturing is explained by higher
growth for high-productivity exporters than for lower-productivity
firms producing only for the domestic market.
17 Bernard et al. (2007). See also Mélitz (2003).
18 The wage regressions in Box 1.2 of Chapter 1 provide some sup-
port for this hypothesis, as they indicate that a rise in productivity
growth is only partially reflected in higher wage growth.
19 See Feenstra (2007) for similar conclusions regarding real wage
growth and relative wage developments in the US.
20 See, for example, Layard et al. (1991) or Nickell (1999). The
“labour demand schedule” showing the relationship between
employment and the real wage under monopolistic competition is
usually denoted the “price-setting schedule”. A seminal theoretical
contribution, showing that equilibrium unemployment is decreasing
in the degree of product market competition in a model with bar-
gaining about both the wage and employment, is Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003).
21 The standard procedure is to control for the cyclical situation. See
also Section 6.2 below.institutions. A number of studies have found product
market deregulations to exert a significant unem-
ployment-decreasing effect. The studies include, for
example, Bertola et al. (2001), Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2005), Griffith et al. (2006) and Bassanini
and Duval (2006).22 This research has found that
reductions in product market regulations have con-
tributed to lower unemployment in Western Europe
over the last 10–15 years. Reductions in both tariff
rates and regulatory barriers to trade have constitut-
ed an important part of these deregulations. A num-
ber of studies have also provided support for the
hypothesis that increased foreign competition has
been an important factor behind lower price-cost
make-ups (see, for example, Kee and Hoekman 2003
or Boulhol et al. 2006).
4.3 Increased sensitivity of employment to wages
A mechanism that partly overlaps with the effect of
increased competition in product markets is that glob-
alisation likely increases the sensitivity of employment
to wage changes, that is the elasticity of labour
demand.
First, an increase in the elasticity of product demand,
following from increased competition in product mar-
kets, also increases the derived elasticity of labour
demand. The explanation is that a wage increase is
partly passed on to prices and therefore leads to a
larger reduction in product demand, and hence out-
put, the higher is the product demand elasticity. This
is translated into a larger fall in labour demand.
Second, the establishment of international production
networks associated with globalisation offers firms
larger possibilities of substituting intermediary inputs
produced by foreign labour for domestic labour
through international outsourcing. This also raises
the elasticity of labour demand. Third, increased pos-
sibilities of moving final goods production abroad
work in the same direction.
According to the theory of trade unions and collec-
tive bargaining, an increased labour demand elasticity
promotes real wage restraint and in this way also
higher employment. The explanation is that a higher
sensitivity of employment to wages increases the costs
to unions of raising wages in the form of larger
employment losses.23 Under some commonly used
assumptions, collective bargaining results in the real
wage being set as a mark-up over the unemployment
benefit: with a higher labour demand elasticity this
mark-up is reduced.
A recent theoretical analysis stressing the links
between outsourcing and the elasticity of labour
demand is Koskela and Stenbacka (2007). They
model international outsourcing as a substitute to
domestic low-skilled labour and show how it raises
the elasticity of labour demand for this category of
workers. In contrast, international outsourcing
works as a complement to high-skilled labour.
According to their analysis, international outsourc-
ing leads to lower wages for low-skilled labour and
higher wages for high-skilled labour. As a conse-
quence, employment increases for the low-skilled
but falls for the high-skilled. If the proportion of
low-skilled in the labour force is high enough,
aggregate equilibrium unemployment in the econo-
my falls.
Empirical research on the link between various
aspects of international integration and labour
demand elasticities is summarised in OECD (2007).
Several studies, but not all, have found that globalisa-
tion tends to raise labour demand elasticities. The
support is stronger for manufacturing than for ser-
vices. On the basis of data from eleven OECD coun-
tries and 20 industries, the OECD study reports new
evidence for a substantial increase in sectoral labour
demand elasticities over the last twenty years (of the
order of magnitude from 0.2 to 0.5).24 The study also
finds a positive relationship between the size of the
labour demand elasticity in different industries and
the intensity of outsourcing.
It follows from our analysis that increased product
market competition not only decreases firms’ price
mark-ups (as discussed in Section 4.2) but also
increases labour demand elasticities (as discussed in
this section). Both effects tend to raise employment:
the first effect because it shifts the employment-real
wage relationship outwards, the second because it
lowers the real wage along a given employment-real
wage relationship. For this reason, one should
expect a stronger positive employment effect from
increased competition in product markets the larg-
er is the bargaining power of unions. The explana-
tion is that increased product market competition
then serves to a larger extent to reduce monopoly
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23 See, for example, Layard et al. (1991), Nickell and Layard (1999)
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power in the labour market as well (in addition to
reducing monopoly power in product markets). A
similar conclusion is drawn by Ebell and Haefke
(2006), who argue that employment effects of prod-
uct market deregulations are almost non-existent if
employees bargain individually with their employer,
whereas the employment effects may be substantial
under collective bargaining.25 The hypothesis that
product market deregulation produces larger em-
ployment gains the larger the bargaining power of
unions has received empirical support in, for exam-
ple, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) and Griffith et
al. (2006).26
4.4 An improved bargaining position of employers
vis-à-vis unions
A higher labour demand elasticity gives unions
incentives to demand lower wages. Yet another effect
of globalisation is that it may improve the relative
bargaining strength of employers vis-à-vis unions.
Then, the outcome of wage negotiations is closer to
the bargaining goals of employers and they will be
able to appropriate a larger share of the rents from
production. 
It is a commonplace to assume that the outcome of
bargaining depends on the fall-back positions, that is
the alternative outcomes in case there is no agreement,
of the parties. The stronger is the fall-back position of
a party, the more favourable will be the outcome for
the party. In the case of wage bargaining, there are
two possible interpretations of the fall-back positions
of unions and employers. One is in terms of a perma-
nent closing down of production, that is a permanent
break-up of the relationship between the employer
and the employees. The other interpretation is in
terms of the pay-offs during a temporary labour mar-
ket conflict – a strike or a lock-out – until agreement
is reached.
Globalisation clearly improves the relative bargaining
position of the employer if disagreement leads to a
permanent closing down of activities, as this will hurt
the employer less in terms of lost profits the larger are
the possibilities of moving production abroad. The
outcome is theoretically less clear with the temporary-
conflict interpretation. On the one hand, larger access
to own units abroad producing final goods or the pos-
sibility to substitute more of intermediary inputs
from abroad for domestic labour implies a smaller
profit loss during a temporary labour market conflict.
On the other hand, the vertical breaking-up of pro-
duction into different complementary stages, some of
which are performed abroad, could mean that the
costs for domestic labour relative to the profit loss for
firms of production disruptions become smaller
(fewer workers on strike might prevent any final out-
put from being produced). Also, to the extent that
globalisation is associated with increased competi-
tion, it might become easier for customers to switch to
other suppliers during a labour market conflict, mak-
ing it more costly to the employer.27
An improved bargaining position of employers tends
to reduce wages. This should have a positive impact
on employment.28 So far, research on how the bar-
gaining power of unions is affected by globalisation
is very limited. But the available evidence does sug-
gest that greater exposure to foreign competition
reduces the share of the surplus from production
obtained by employees. In a study of five EU coun-
tries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK),
Dumont et al. (2006) found that both stronger import
competition and more production facilities abroad
reduce the bargaining power of labour. Similarly,
stronger import competition (from other advanced
economies though not from low-wage economies!)
has been a major cause of the reduction in bargain-
ing strength of employees in the UK from the
mid–1990s, according to a study by Boulhol et al.
(2006). Earlier, Kramarz (2003) found that stronger
25 The absence of substantial employment effects of product market
deregulation under individual bargaining is explained by an incen-
tive of firms to overhire in this case. When employees bargain indi-
vidually, their bargaining strength depends on the profit loss they
can inflict on the employer if bargaining breaks down. This loss is
larger, the higher is the marginal revenue product of the employee.
Hence, since the marginal revenue product is decreasing in employ-
ment, the firm has an incentive to hire employees beyond the point
at which the marginal revenue product equals the wage: doing this,
the bargained wage of all employees falls. Because the marginal rev-
enue product is more steeply decreasing the higher is the monopoly
power of the firm, increased product market competition reduces
overhiring at the same time as it weakens the incentive to restrict out-
put and employment to prop up prices. In their model, Ebell and
Haefke find these two effects to more or less cancel out.
26 Note that the two effects of increased product market competition
discussed above tend to offset each other for real wages. This is a pos-
sible explanation of why we found no direct effects of product mar-
ket regulation or globalisation variables on wage growth in the
regressions in Box 1.2 of Chapter 1. Griffith et al. (2006) find, how-
ever, that increased competition produces real wage gains.
27 But costs to employees could also increase to the extent that there is
a long-run loss of market shares resulting in employment reductions.
28 The conclusion presupposes that the employer has “the right to
manage”, that is to determine employment unilaterally in a profit-
maximising way after the wage has been bargained with the trade
union. Rodrik (1997) has instead analysed an increase in the fall-
back level of profits in a so-called efficient bargaining model, which
assumes that firms and unions bargain over both the wage and
employment. In that setting, the union and the employer will agree
on such a high level of employment that the marginal product of
labour falls short of the wage rate. Employees share the rents from
production with the employer through both a higher wage than in
alternative employment and “overemployment”. Under these condi-
tions, an increase in the fall-back level of profits causes a reduction
in both wages and employment. However, the right-to-manage
assumption is a more realistic characterisation of how collective bar-
gaining actually occurs than the efficient-bargaining assumption,
since bargaining over employment is unusual.import competition had reduced the bargaining
power of labour in French firms. 
4.5 Changes in labour market institutions
Yet another effect of globalisation may be to trigger
changes in fundamental labour market institutions.
This could come about either as endogenous respons-
es in the labour market or as a result of changes in
government regulation.
Ebell and Haefke (2006) have analysed how an
increase in competitive pressures could lead to de-
unionisation.29 The key effect driving their results is
that under collective bargaining, the rents accruing to
the unions depend on the firms’ profits, whereas
under individual bargaining the rents that can be
extracted by the individual only depend on the cost to
the firm of replacing her/him.
Employees in a firm face a choice whether to bargain
for wages collectively or individually. Under collective
bargaining, they are able to appropriate a given share
of the surplus from production. The lower the degree
of competition, the larger is the surplus from produc-
tion in a monopolistically competitive firm and hence
the higher is the wage that is negotiated under collec-
tive bargaining. Under individual bargaining, the
wage depends positively on the marginal value of a
worker, as this determines the output loss to the firm
of not being able to reach an agreement with an indi-
vidual worker (and thus the bargaining power of the
worker). In equilibrium, the marginal value of a
worker must equal the cost of hiring the worker. The
higher the degree of competition, the more vacancies
are opened by firms. This implies higher hiring costs
and thus also a higher marginal value of a worker.
Hence, the wage under individual bargaining is high-
er, the higher is the degree of competition. It follows
that workers may prefer collective bargaining when
competition is low and individual bargaining when
competition is high. An increase in import competi-
tion could therefore induce deunionisation, that is
move an economy from collective to individual bar-
gaining.30
Alternatively, globalisation pressures could lead to
changes in government regulation. A set of legislated
rules (including generous unemployment benefits,
rules allowing unions wide scope for strike action,
favourable conditions for union membership and
high tax wedges) all contribute to pushing up wages
and reducing the return to capital. But if employers
to a larger extent can move production abroad to
low-cost locations, then such “regulation” becomes
much less effective in securing high wages, as the
domestic rents to be shared by employees are reduced
and the employment costs are increased. Boulhol
(2007) has analysed how such an increase in capital
mobility creates political incentives to reduce regula-
tion. These incentives are particularly strong if costs
of international trade fall at the same time, because
this makes it more profitable for firms to relocate
abroad and supply also the domestic market from
that location. 
4.6 Terms-of-trade effects
A final aspect on the employment effects of globalisa-
tion follows from the substantial improvement for
advanced economies over the last ten years in the non-
oil terms of trade, that is the price of exports relative
to the price of non-oil imports. This development is
shown in Figure 3.9. Terms-of-trade changes can
influence wages and employment because they drive a
wedge between the real product wage (the nominal
wage deflated by the producer price index) and the
real consumption wage (the nominal wage deflated by
the CPI).
An improvement in the terms of trade raises the pro-
ducer price index relative to the CPI. Hence, the real
consumption wage can rise at the same time as the
real product wage falls. Because it is the real product
wage that determines employment, such an improve-
ment in the terms of trade makes it possible to
increase both employment and consumption possibil-
ities of employed workers at the same time. This effect
has been demonstrated to be empirically important
for employment determination in Sweden by
Lindblad and Sellin (2007). Also, in the wage regres-
sions in Box 1.2 of Chapter 1, we found no significant
impact of a terms-of-trade change on nominal wage
growth (holding the rate of CPI inflation constant):
the implication is that an improvement in the terms of
trade is fully translated into a reduction in the real
product wage.
A related argument focuses on how ongoing changes
in the terms of trade affect the interaction between
inflation and nominal wage rigidity. The reasoning
is based on the analysis by Akerlof et al. (1996) of
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how low inflation together with downward nominal
wage rigidity may cause unemployment. The mech-
anism is that there are always some firms in the
economy that are exposed to adverse shocks and
would need to reduce their real product wages to
defend employment. If there is a binding restriction
that nominal wages cannot be cut, more of such real
wage adjustments are prevented the lower is infla-
tion (as this decreases the possibilities of reducing
real wages through price increases instead). Hence,
Box 3.1 
Political repercussions from labour market integration: the case of Germany 
Germany provides an interesting case study of the political forces that can be set to work by increased integration
between regions. Burda (2000) argued that the globalisation shock may help the countries of Western Europe to
overcome their rigidities, leading to a wave of reforms that will eventually make gains from trade possible. He saw
EU eastern enlargement as a “Trojan horse”, through which the vested interests of unions and firms can be weakened.
Examining German unification, Burda found evidence for the interrelation between unemployment and the rigidity of 
labour market institutions. In eastern Germany, the adoption of western German wage agreements led to a collapse of
employment. However, the high rates of unemployment in turn triggered a landslide decline in union membership,
nearly eliminating union power in the eastern part of the country. Similarly, Schöb and Wildasin (2007) presume that
migration is a fundamental determinant of labour market institutions. In their model, wage rigidities are endogenously
determined by the degree of labour market integration among regions. Their analysis shows that the east-west
integration of labour markets can be conducive to the development of more flexible labour markets.
However, the German experiences also show that employment-promoting labour-market reforms are not the only
possible outcome of increased international integration. The downward pressure on wages resulting from globali-
sation and the forces of factor price equalisation could also cause demands on the government to provide more 
protection. This seems currently to be the case in Germany where the vast majority of the population now appears to
be in favour of a rollback of Chancellor Schröder’s Agenda 2010, a reform that made the German labour market more
flexible. The Agenda 2010 reforms abolished Germany’s second-tier unemployment assistance scheme (Arbeitslosen-
hilfe), which guaranteed unlimited unemployment benefits at about 55 percent of the previous wage, if necessary
until retirement. One million people in the west and one million people in the east lost this support. Long-term
unemployed now only receive the so-called Arbeitslosengeld II. This is basically the same as Germany’s pre-existing
Social Aid, a benefit available to any needy person with a level unrelated to the previous wage and employment
history, with the exception that by reducing the transfer withdrawal rate from 100 to 80 percent, the government now
effectively subsidises about 1.1 million full-time jobs in the low-wage segment. The Schröder government moreover 
cut the period during which ordinary unemployment benefits can be received for persons under 55 years of age from
up to 32 to 12 months, in the case of older people above 57 years of age from 32 to 18 months.
The reforms of the Schröder government appear to have been very successful in terms of creating more employment.
While job growth was on average 1.6 percent in 2006, the employment of older workers (above 50 years of age)
increased by 4.9 percent. Moreover, for the first time since 1970 German unemployment fell below its rising trend.
There has been a number of booms and stagnation periods since 1970, but the current boom is the first where
unemployment did not rise relative to the previous boom. In the winter 2007/2008, German employment in full-time 
equivalents was about as high as it was towards the end of the last boom in the winter 2001/2002, and the forecasts 
predict that it will even increase beyond that level in 2008.
Despite this success, Germany’s labour market reforms have caused substantial opposition. The reforms nearly split
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and were the main factor behind the electoral success of the new left-wing party
“Die Linke”, led by Oskar Lafontaine.
In view of the increasing opposition, the coalition government of CDU/CSU and SPD waived substantial elements of
the Agenda 2010 reforms. The first move was to prolong the eligibility period for elderly unemployed from 18 to
24 months. Then, in December 2007, the government imposed high minimum wages – ranging from about eight to
ten euros per hour – in the postal sector through the extension by law (Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung) of the
collective agreement encompassing the earlier state monopoly Deutsche Post to all firms in the sector. The coalition
government moreover decided to apply the minimum wage procedure used in the postal sector to a number of other 
sectors that will yet have to be specified. The SPD has even announced that it wants to legislate a national minimum
wage of 7.50 euros.
The German minimum wage discussion was originally motivated by the desire to protect Deutsche Post, which would
lose the last parts of its monopoly position by 1 January 2008, from foreign and domestic low-wage competitors.
However, this discussion has triggered a new national debate about inequality and globalisation. Surveys show that
currently more than two thirds of the German population are in favour of legal minimum wages.
Both the extension of the unemployment benefit period for elderly workers and the imposition of minimum wages
will make the labour market more rigid, not more flexible. This reduces the hope that Germany could successfully
cope with the forces of globalisation in the foreseeable future.  at very low inflation, a further fall in inflation may
be associated with higher unemployment (a nega-
tively sloped Phillips curve). Now, if central banks
are successful at achieving their inflation targets – as
they have been over the last decade – ongoing terms-
of-trade improvements relax the Akerlof et al. con-
straint on the adjustment of real product wages.
This follows because a given rate of CPI inflation is
associated with higher price increases for domestic
output, the larger the rate of improvement in the
terms of trade.31
The improvements in the non-oil terms of trade for
advanced economies over the last decade have been a
natural consequence of the gradual increase in the rel-
ative supply of labour-intensive goods associated with
the integration of low-wage economies into the world
trading system. But one should not expect this trend
to continue indefinitely and it might very well be
reversed as the emerging economies upgrade the capi-
tal and skill intensity of their output. 
5. Relative labour demand and globalisation 
Section 3 gave the theoretical arguments for why
globalisation could cause unemployment in advanced
economies with rigid labour markets. Section 4
analysed instead how globalisation could help relax
these rigidities, which would instead promote
employment. So, ultimately the employment effects
of globalisation are an empirical issue. This section
surveys the empirical research on relative labour
demand effects, whereas Sec-
tion 6 instead looks at effects on
total employment. 
There is little doubt that relative
demand for low-skilled labour
has declined in most OECD
countries. But there is an ongoing
debate on the extent to which this
depends on increased trade inte-
gration with low-wage econo-
mies. Another possible explana-
tion – in fact the one favoured by
most economists – is that the rel-
ative-demand shift is mainly due
to skill-biased technological
change. The argument is that
technological advances embodied
in new capital (robots, computers, telecom equipment
etc.) substitute for low-skilled workers, as simple tasks
can be replaced this way. In contrast, these advances
serve as complements to high-skilled workers, thereby
enhancing their productivity. It is easy to understand
the reason for the competing explanations as the
reduction in demand for low-skilled labour coincided
both with rising low-wage imports and with rapid
computerisation of workplaces.
5.1 Trade and relative wages
Most of the research on the trade effects on the rela-
tive demand for unskilled versus skilled labour has
concerned the US. The focus has been to explain the
increased skill wage premium in this country (see
Figure 3.7 in Section 3). The literature has produced
(at least) three major approaches: factor content
analysis, price equations and studies of within-indus-
try versus between-industry factor proportions.32
Factor content analysis
The idea here is that trade in goods is disguised trade
in production factors. A country that exports skill-
intensive goods in exchange for low-skill-intensive
imports in fact exports skilled labour in exchange for
low-skilled labour. Thereby, international goods
transactions change the relative demand for labour.
The methodology is to multiply input coefficients for
different skill types with export and import volumes.
Comparing the demands for various types of labour




31 This argument is due to Rogoff (2007).
32 For reviews, see, for instance, Richardson (1995), Freeman (1995)
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would be necessary to produce the imports domesti-
cally provides measures of the changes in factor
demands. Using estimates of the elasticity of substi-
tution between high-skilled and low-skilled labour,
one can compute the change in the relative wage nec-
essary to accommodate the change in relative
demand. Finally, one can divide this value by the total
change in relative wages to get the percentage of rela-
tive wage change that can be explained by interna-
tional trade.
There are quite a few empirical studies following this
approach – the vast majority using US data for the
1970s and 1980s. Generally, the evidence speaks
against a prominent role for international trade in
explaining rising wage inequality. In a widely cited
paper, Katz and Murphy (1992) find that internation-
al trade affected female high-school dropouts the
most. However, relative demand did not fall by more
than four percent for this group in 1979-85. For earli-
er periods and other groups, the authors calculate
much lower figures. Borjas et al. (1997) claim that
trade with less developed countries could only explain
up to ten percent of the declining relative wage of
high-school dropouts between 1980 and 1995.
Wood (1994, 1995, 1998) strongly opposes this view
by arguing that factor content studies are downward-
ly biased for three reasons. First, the assumption that
imports would be produced with the skill intensity
used by domestic producers is implausible because
developed countries have outsourced the most
labour-intensive parts of the value chain. As a conse-
quence, the reduction in demand for low-skilled
labour due to international trade is underestimated.
Second, technological change is interrelated with
international trade. One reason is that the mere threat
of low-wage competition creates incentives for firms
to invest in new technology to reduce costs.33 Another
reason is that trade also functions as a transmission
channel for technological progress.34 Moreover, tech-
nological improvements in information and commu-
nication technologies are major factors behind the
reductions in trade costs that are important explana-
tions of the increases in the volume of trade. Hence,
it is very difficult to disentangle the influence of skill-
biased technological change from the influence of
international trade. Third, standard factor content
analysis might understate the impact of trade
because it usually does not take trade in services into
account. 
In addition, Davis and Weinstein (2001) have argued
that factor content analysis might be misleading as
differences in technology between trade partners are
not taken into account. The authors extend the stan-
dard Heckscher-Ohlin model in this regard and argue
that the data then support the model predictions.
Stolper-Samuelson effects 
A second approach uses the Stolper-Samuelson theo-
rem suggesting a direct link between goods and factor
prices (see the introduction to Section 3). In particu-
lar, the relative wage of low-skilled workers should
decline if the prices of goods using low-skilled labour
intensively fall relative to goods using high-skilled
labour intensively. So, if relative price changes origi-
nating from trade with low-wage economies explained
relative wage declines of unskilled labour in advanced
economies, one should find that goods prices in
import industries have declined relative to goods
prices in export industries. Lawrence and Slaughter
(1993) found for the US that the relative price of
goods that use production labour (a proxy for
unskilled labour) intensively rose slightly in the 1980s.
Hence, the Stolper-Samuelson effect worked towards
more, rather than less, wage equality during this peri-
od. Several other studies have also failed to find a rel-
ative price trend in the US consistent with a Stolper-
Samuelson explanation of rising wage inequality.35
Studies for Europe have come up with similar
results.36
There are, however, several problems with price stud-
ies. Apart from the poor data quality, a common argu-
ment has been that changes in goods prices likely
translate into relative wage effects only after a sub-
stantial time lag (Slaughter 1998). Wood (1998) also
points out that even four-digit industry level data may
still be too aggregated to detect the relevant price
changes since international outsourcing of the most
labour-intensive tasks is likely to occur also within
industries defined at this level.
Changes in within-industry and between-industry factor
proportions
A third approach uses another insight from standard
trade theory. As low-wage competition should reduce
relative wages of low-skilled labour, it should induce
33 See also Borjas et al. (1997) and Rodrik (1997).
34 See Coe and Helpman (1995) and Keller (2002, 2004).
35 These studies include Bhagwati (1991) and Baldwin and Cain
(1997). Leamer (1998) failed to find evidence in favour of a Stolper-
Samuelson explanation of rising wage inequality for the 1980s,
although he did so for the 1970s. Sachs and Shatz (1994) is one of the
few studies that have found such results also for the 1980s.
36 See Lawrence (1996), Neven and Wyplosz (1996) or Lücke (1997).all industries to produce with lower skill intensity. In
contrast, technological change that is biased towards
skilled labour could bring about higher skill intensity
in all industries.
Berman et al. (1998) and Autor et al. (1998) provide
evidence that within-industry skill-upgrading is the
dominant pattern in the US. On these grounds, they
conclude that skill-biased technological change must
be the main explanation of increased wage differen-
tials between skilled and unskilled labour. Lawrence
and Slaughter (1993) also found that US manufactur-
ing firms employed more non-production workers rel-
ative to production workers – an outcome that is
inconsistent with the predictions of the Heckscher-
Ohlin trade model.
One shortcoming of this approach, however, is that
results are very sensitive to the level of aggregation.
5.2 International outsourcing and offshoring
More recently, the trade versus technological change
debate has continued in the literature on interna-
tional outsourcing and offshoring. To reduce costs,
firms have increasingly used the opportunity to
import labour-intensive intermediate products –
which they earlier produced themselves – from inde-
pendent or affiliated firms in low-wage countries
(see Section 2.1).
The literature tries to single out labour market effects
by regressing the wage bill (cost) share or relative
employment of low-skilled workers in industrialised
countries on imports of intermediate goods. If firms
relocate the parts of their value chain that are inten-
sive in low skills to low-wage countries, this will exert
downward pressure on relative demand for this type
of labour, as was discussed in Section 3. This can
show up in both relative wage and relative employ-
ment developments.
Imports of intermediary inputs
Quite a few studies have examined the impact of larg-
er imports of intermediate goods on relative wages or
relative employment of skilled versus unskilled
labour. As discussed in Section 2.1, the terminology
varies in the literature. Sometimes the term interna-
tional outsourcing is used, sometimes the term off-
shoring. As above, we use the term international out-
sourcing as synonymous with increased imports of
intermediate goods.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b) started off the out-
sourcing literature arguing that the growth of imports
of intermediary inputs over the period 1979–87
explains 15–50 percent of the increase in the wage
share of non-production workers in the US. In a later
study, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) developed a new
estimation procedure to disentangle the effects of
skill-biased technological change and outsourcing on
wages. Using US data from 1979-1990, they conclud-
ed in their basic specification that the former explains
about 35 percent of the increase in the relative wage of
non-production workers, whereas the latter accounts
for 15 percent. But in alternative specifications, they
found that outsourcing can even explain up to 40 per-
cent of the relative wage change. Anderton and
Brenton (1999) found, using data from 1970–1986 for
the textile and electronics industries in the UK, that
imports from low-wage countries may account for up
to 40 percent of the increase in skilled workers’ wage
share during that period. Likewise, in a more recent
study, Hijzen et al. (2005) found a strong negative
impact of international outsourcing on labour
demand for low-skilled labour in UK manufacturing
industries between 1984 and 1995.
Geishecker and Görg (2006) examined the German
case and provided evidence that a one percentage
point increase in international outsourcing (measured
as the value of imported intermediate inputs relative
to the industry’s total output value) reduces the real
wage for workers in the lowest skill categories by up to
1.5 percent, while it increases the real wage for high-
skilled workers by up to 2.6 percent. The study is par-
ticularly interesting as it captures the 1990s – the
decade in which outsourcing increased substantially
due to the integration of Eastern Europe in the world
economy. Studying German manufacturing firms
between 1970 and 1993, Diehl (1999) showed that out-
sourcing of intermediate inputs can be regarded as
substitutes for low-skilled labour.
Strauss-Kahn (2004) undertook a similar analysis for
relative employment effects in the French manufac-
turing industry. Her results suggest that international
outsourcing explained 10–15 percent of the decline in
the share of unskilled workers in total manufacturing
employment for the 1977–1985 period and 25 percent
of the decline in the 1985–1993 period.
Ekholm and Hakkala (2005) distinguished between
outsourcing to low-income and high-income coun-
tries for Sweden in 1995–2000. While imports of inter-
mediate inputs from advanced economies has no sta-
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tistically significant effect on cost shares, the finding
was that outsourcing to low-wage countries tends to
reduce the cost share of workers with an intermediate
level of education.
Using 84 Canadian manufacturing industries over the
1981–1996 period, Yan (2006) provides evidence that
international outsourcing increased demand for high-
skilled workers. For small jurisdictions like Hong
Kong, the nexus between outsourcing and wage
changes seems to be stronger than for bigger coun-
tries. Between 1976 and 1996, Hsieh and Woo (1999)
found that outsourcing to mainland China can
explain up to 60 percent of the rise in the share of the
non-production workers’ wage bill.
More generally, Feenstra and Hanson (2004) argue
that empirical results on relative labour demand
effects are very sensitive to the specification of tech-
nology. With respect to US data, taking the share of
IT investment in total investment as a proxy for skill-
biased technological change attaches much higher
explanatory power to this factor than outsourcing.37
However, if instead the stock of IT equipment as a
share of the total capital stock is used to capture tech-
nological change – which Feenstra and Hanson claim
to be a superior measure – then outsourcing turns out
to be the main determinant of the increase in the rel-
ative demand for non-production workers.
Foreign direct investment
A related literature looks at wage and employment
effects of relocating economic activity to foreign affil-
iates (offshoring). Lawrence (1994) only found a
rather weak link with regard to US multinationals
between 1977 and 1989. Similarly, Slaughter (2000)
also failed to find strong evidence looking at US
multinationals between 1977 and 1994. In constrast,
Head and Ries (2002) showed that the wage bill of
skilled workers in multinational Japanese firms in the
period 1965–1990 was positively correlated with the
share of a firm’s employment in low-wage countries.
Moreover, additional foreign affiliate employment in
Japanese multinational firms was associated with
greater use of non-production relative to production
labour at home.
In a well-know paper, Feenstra and Hanson (1997)
argue that foreign direct investment may bring about
rising wage inequality in both the low-wage and the
high-wage country. The reason is that the offshored
tasks are likely to be the ones requiring the least skills
in the high-wage country at the same time as they are
the ones requiring the most skills in the low-wage
country. Empirically, Feenstra and Hanson find that
FDI to Mexican maquiladoras (companies located
close to the US-Mexican border) can account for
45 percent of the rise in the cost share of non-pro-
duction workers in Mexico.
Becker et al. (2007) use data on German multination-
als to investigate the relationship between offshoring
and the workforce composition at the parent firm.
While there is no statistically significant link between
foreign activity and the share of blue- and white-col-
lar jobs in the onshore wage bill, the study finds a sta-
tistically significant positive association between the
degree of offshoring and the wage-bill share of work-
ers with upper secondary education. However, the
effect is very small.
5.3 What have we learnt about relative demand?
The upshot is that there is support for the hypothesis
that globalisation has contributed to the fall in the rel-
ative demand for low-skilled labour in advanced
countries. The support is stronger in recent studies of
international outsourcing than in earlier studies of
overall trade effects, which have often suggested that
skill-biased technological change has been the by far
most important factor. A fundamental problem, how-
ever, is that it is inherently difficult to disentangle the
effects of increased trade with low-wage economies
and technological change driven by adjustment to
low-wage competition.
One must also keep in mind that most of the research
on relative labour demand effects has concerned the
US. There could be an important difference between
Western Europe and the US insofar as Western
Europe has been affected much more by the fall of the
Iron Curtain. Because of the geographical proximity
of Eastern Europe, the costs of trade between these
countries and Western Europe are likely to have fallen
to much lower levels than trade costs for the US. 
Another crucial consideration concerns the delin-
eation of groups affected in different ways by globali-
sation. A common argument is that the distinction
between high-skilled and low-skilled labour is gradu-
ally losing relevance. This view has been articulated
by, for example, Autor et al. (2003), Blinder (2006)
and Baldwin (2006). The idea is that the characteristic 37 See also Feenstra (2007).feature of globalisation is the unbundling of tasks in
the production process. What tasks it is profitable to
relocate abroad may have little to do with the skill
contents. Instead it is rather a question of the charac-
ter of the tasks: whether or not they are routine ones
that require direct face-to-face interaction. This dis-
tinction is likely to cut through skill differences. Call-
centre services are good candidates for international
outsourcing, but taxi driving is not, although both
tasks are low-skill. Software programming and med-
ical interpretation of X-rays can be profitably out-
sourced to a low-wage country, whereas this is not the
case for personal coaching of managers or psychiatric
care. Hence, globalisation can entail large shifts in rel-
ative labour demand between groups that cannot be
defined in terms of skill level.38
6. Globalisation and overall employment – 
empirical evidence
Section 2 documented the fast pace of globalisation
over the last 10–15 years in terms of both trade and
foreign direct investment. The section also document-
ed how both trade with low-wage economies and for-
eign direct investment in them had grown much faster
than the overall figures.
A first observation is that the recent period of inten-
sive globalisation has coincided with a strong
improvement in the employment situation in the
EU15. Figure 3.10 shows how employment as a per-
centage of working-age population increased from
around 60 percent in 1995 to around 65 percent in
2006 in the EU15. During the same period aggregate
unemployment in the region fell from around 11 to
8 percent. These favourable labour market develop-
ments contrast starkly to the strong rise in unemploy-
ment and the weak employment developments
between 1975 and 1995. This represents prima facie
evidence that recent globalisation has not had strong
adverse effects on aggregate employment in Western
Europe: at least the effects have not been so strong
that they have offset favourable influences on employ-
ment from other factors.
This section reviews empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship between globalisation and overall employ-
ment. Section 6.1 surveys existing empirical studies.
Section 6.2 reports new empirical results of our own. 
6.1 Existing empirical studies
Although many studies exist on the effects of trade
and outsourcing on relative demand for different cat-
egories of labour, there is an apparent lack of stud-
ies of the effects on total demand and employment.
Instead, much of the discussion has come to rely on
very crude business consultants’ estimates of jobs
lost or at risk due to international outsourcing. This
is unfortunate as the estimates are usually derived
from small surveys of a particular consultancy firm’s
clients and the actual sample data are almost always
confidential.39 Moreover, even at best the estimates
are only partial-equilibrium as they likely do not
capture positive employment effects due to cost sav-
ings or increased aggregate wage flexibility. Nor do
such data cover any positive effects from export
increases.
The econometric material available consists almost
entirely of studies of labour demand equations,
that is of how the relationship
between total employment in a
sector and the wage is affected
by international outsourcing or
overall import penetration.
Since the estimations are con-
ditional on wages, these studies
do not capture the full general-
equilibrium effects, taking pos-





38 Becker et al. (2007) also examine the
relationship between the task composition
in the parent firms of German multina-
tionals and the degree of offshoring. The
finding is that the proportion of non-rou-
tine and interactive tasks increases with
offshoring, especially in the service sector.
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A couple of recent studies have estimated the pure
substitution effect of international outsourcing and
offshoring. Using two-digit manufacturing data for
seven EU countries for 1995–2000, Falk and
Wolfmayr (2005) studied the association between, on
the one hand, the change in sectoral employment
and, on the other hand, international outsourcing,
output and wages. Holding both output and wages
constant, they found such outsourcing to be associat-
ed with substantial employment reductions.
Similarly, using cross-section data from German and
Swedish multinational enterprises Becker et al. (2005)
found the wage gap to affiliate firms in Central and
Eastern Europe to have a statistically significant neg-
ative relationship to employment in the parent firms
in regressions where they controlled for sales.40 The
studies confirm the existence of negative substitution
effects of international outsourcing/offshoring on
domestic employment, but say nothing about the
total effects as they do not include any scale effects
(nor address the issue of wage adjustments in
response to globalisation).
Amiti and Wei (2005a) studied the effect of outsourc-
ing on total sectoral labour demand in the UK in
1995–2001. They estimated both conditional labour
demand equations (controlling for output) capturing
only the substitution effect and unconditional equa-
tions capturing both substitution and scale effects.
For manufacturing sectors, they found no significant
effects of material outsourcing on employment in any
specifications, whereas service outsourcing often had
a positive labour demand effect.41 For service sectors,
negative labour demand effects were sometimes
found, but results were not very robust.
Amiti and Wei (2005b) is a similar analysis for the
US for 1992–2000. This study found a negative asso-
ciation between outsourcing of services and sectoral
manufacturing employment when decomposing the
economy into 450 sectors, but no significant effects
when aggregating sectors to only 96. The likely
explanation of why the level of aggregation matters
is that the substitution effects on employment are
larger relative to the scale effects of cost savings, the
more narrowly defined the sector is. Material out-
sourcing was not found to have any significant effect
on employment except in a few cases (when the effect
was positive). In contrast, there was a robust nega-
tive effect from import penetration in general (the
overall import share in a sector). Results did not dif-
fer much between conditional and unconditional
labour demand equations.
A recent OECD study (2007) uses a panel of sectors
in a set of OECD countries 1987–2003, finding a neg-
ative association between overall import penetration
and sectoral employment in both conditional and
unconditional estimations. The effects of outsourcing
are studied with cross-sectional data. Then the study
finds a significant, negative association between
employment and narrow outsourcing (imports of
intermediate inputs from the same sector) if one con-
trols for output. But there is no significant association
between employment and broad outsourcing (imports
of intermediate inputs from all sectors) if output is
held constant. The unconditional effects of outsourc-
ing when output is allowed to change, so that the pos-
itive scale effects of cheaper inputs are taken into
account, are more favourable for employment: then
there is no adverse effect from narrow outsourcing
and a significant, positive effect from broad outsourc-
ing. The probable explanation of the difference in
results between narrow and broad outsourcing is sim-
ilar to the explanation of why the level of aggregation
matters in Amiti and Wei (2005b): substitution possi-
bilities with domestic labour in a sector are larger if
the imported inputs are produced in the own sector,
whereas the cost-savings effects should be similar
independent of whether the imported inputs originate
from the own sector or other sectors.
Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) can be seen as an
attempt to estimate general equilibrium effects of
trade with low-wage economies on employment. They
examined the employment effects of trade with the
newly industrialised Asian economies in France,
Germany, Italy and the UK in 1992–95, using data for
different sectors and categories of employees.
Although they found import penetration from Asian
economies to have adverse employment effects in a
couple of specifications, their overall result was that
trade flows did not have a significant effect on
European employment.
6.2 New empirical results
The survey of empirical studies in the preceding sec-
tion casts doubt on the hypothesis that globalisation
tends to reduce employment, as adverse employment
effects are usually not found even when wage reac-
40 The estimated employment effects were, however, quite small. This
is in line with earlier results for the US by Brainard and Riker (2001)
and for EU15 countries by Konings and Murphy (2001).
41 Surprisingly enough, these positive employment effects were found
mainly in the conditional estimations where output was controlled
for.tions are not taken into account.
This section adds to the empirical
research by reporting some re-
sults of our own that attempt to
capture these effects as well. We
first look at some simple correla-
tions and then estimate regres-
sions for unemployment and
employment.
Simple cross-country correlations
A couple of OECD studies have
looked at simple cross-country
correlations between trade open-
ness and employment and con-
cluded that there is no evident
relationship (OECD 2005, 2007).
This applies to levels of employ-
ment-population ratios and trade
openness as well as to changes in these variables.
However, if the main worry is that trade with low-
wage economies and capital movements to them
could threaten jobs in Western Europe, it is more rel-
evant to look directly at these factors. This is done in
Figures 3.11–3.16. Low-wage economies are defined
as non-OECD countries excluding OPEC countries.
Figures 3.11–3.13 plot relationships in levels. Figu-
re 3.11 shows the relationship between trade open-
ness (exports plus imports relative to GDP of ad-
vanced countries) to low-wage economies and unem-
ployment, whereas Figure 3.12 shows the relation-
ship between the same measure of trade openness
and the employment rate (the
ratio of employment to work-
ing-age population). Figure 3.13
shows instead the relationship
between the FDI stock owned
by the various EU15 countries
in low-wage economies (as a per-
centage of the GDP of the coun-
try of origin) and the employ-
ment rate. Figures 3.14–3.16
show the relationships between
changes in the same variables
over the 1994–2004 period.
None of the scatter plots shows a
significant, adverse relationship
between economic integration
with low-wage economies and the
employment indicator. In fact,
the only significant relationship
found is a positive correlation between the outward
FDI stock in low-wage economies and the employ-
ment rate in the country of origin (Figure 3.13).
New regressions
It is customary to try to explain differences in unem-
ployment or employment in panel data for OECD
countries (that is variations both across countries and
over time) by differences in a number of labour mar-
ket institutions.42 A recent such attempt is Bassanini
and Duval (2006), whose results were also reported in
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(un)employment effects of globalisation, we have aug-
mented the Bassanini-Duval regressions with vari-
ables capturing the degree of economic integration
with low-wage economies (defined as non-OPEC,
non-OECD economies). We have tried variables such
as trade openness (exports + imports as a percentage
of GDP), import dependence (imports as a percent of
GDP) and outward stock of FDI as a percentage of
domestic GDP. Such equations can be seen as a way
of trying to capture the general equilibrium effects on
(un)employment of integration with low-wage eco-
nomies, controlling for both a number of institution-
al variables and the business cycle. The regressions
should thus incorporate the effects of induced wage
adjustments.43
Table 3.8 shows unemployment
regressions. The original Bassa-
nini-Duval results with respect to
labour market institutions and the
cyclical situation of the economy
remain more or less unchanged
when various globalisation indica-
tors are added: high replacement
rates in unemployment insurance
and high tax wedges tend to raise
unemployment, whereas a high
degree of coordination in wage
bargaining (corporatism) and pos-
itive output gaps over the cycle
tend to reduce unemployment.
The only major difference to the
original Bassanini-Duval regres-
sions is that product market regu-
lations, which tended to reduce
unemployment there, are mostly insignificant in our
regressions and that there is sometimes a negative, sig-
nificant effect of union density but not of corporatism.
As can be seen, large trade with low-wage economies
(measured either as trade openness or import depen-
dence) has a significant unemployment-reducing effect
in four of the five specifications where such a variable is
included (in the fifth specification the low-wage trade
variable is not significant). In two of the three regres-
sions where it is included, the outward stock of foreign
investment in low-wage economies has an insignificant
effect on unemployment (but it has a positively signifi-
cant effect in the third specification). When imports
from low-wage economies and FDI stock in them are
included in the same equation
(column 7), both variables are
insignificant. 
Since the relative roles of global-
isation and skill-biased techno-
logical change have been an issue
in the analysis of relative de-
mand for low-skilled versus high-
skilled labour (see Section 5), we
also experimented with including
the share of ICT investment in
total investment as a proxy for
such technological change in the
Figure 3.13
Figure 3.14
43 The regressions are not, however, so
general-equilibrium that they take into
account that the institutions themselves
may change in response to globalisation
(see Section 4.5). Similar regressions have
been done by Köll (2007) with partly sim-
ilar results.regressions. This affected the estimated coefficients of
the globalisation variables only marginally. The main
effect was to make the unemployment benefit and
corporatism variables insignificant. 
Table 3.9 shows regressions with the employment rate
(the ratio between employment and working-age
population) as the dependent variable. Of the
Bassanini-Duval variables, the output gap is always
significant here, too. The unemployment benefit
replacement rate, the tax wedge and union density are
sometimes significant, whereas the corporatism vari-
able never is. The variables capturing trade with low-
wage economies always have a significantly positive
effect on employment. So has the outward FDI stock
in low-wage economies. 
The exercise we have performed
is a very crude one. For example,
we have not taken account of the
possibility that causation could
run also in the reverse direction,
that is from (un)employment to
integration with low-wage eco-
nomies and labour market insti-
tutions (simultaneity bias).44
Still, our regressions provide no
support for adverse employment
effects of globalisation in ad-
vanced economies if we control
for labour market institutions
and the business cycle. If any-
thing, our empirical analysis
rather suggests positive employ-
ment effects.
7. What to do and what not to do
Our basic message is that we probably should not
expect globalisation to have adverse effects on overall
employment in Western Europe in the long run if one
takes all effects into account. It is true that trade inte-
gration and factor mobility vis-à-vis low-wage
economies are likely to cause unemployment if
European labour markets remain rigid. But there is a
good chance that globalisation will help reduce these
rigidities. Politicians in some countries may try to
swim against the tide and uphold or even strengthen
regulations in the labour market, such as Germany is
currently doing. But in the end, globalisation is likely
to strengthen the incentives to
deregulate. Therefore, the net
result could be that employment
is promoted.
If globalisation does not hurt
employment, it will produce ag-
gregate gains. There is a possibil-
ity that globalisation could even-
tually benefit almost everyone,
although some will gain more





44 We did, however, some experimentation
with interaction variables, that is if the
value of one explanatory variable could
affect the impact of another explanatory
variable on (un)employment. For exam-
ple, we examined the interaction between
the replacement rate and the globalisation
variables, but found no support for more
adverse labour market effects with higher
replacement rates.EEAG Report 97
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also a fair amount of evidence that economic integra-
tion with low-wage economies reduces the relative
demand for less-skilled workers and their relative
compensation. So, it is also possible that there could
be a large group of losers.
If a country as a whole gains from trade, the gainers
can in principle always compensate the losers by trans-
ferring money to them while retaining positive net
gains. In principle, for each episode of trade reform,
one could compute who gains and who loses, and agree
on a set of transfers that would build (unanimous) sup-
port for the reform. In practice, of course, such a
process is very difficult, as it runs into the difficulty of
precisely computing the gains and the losses and is sub-
ject to capture and renegotiation. Such once-and-for-
all compensation schemes have been observed in the
past in the context of trade liberalisations that affected
one sector only. One example is the closing of the
Spanish naval construction industry in the late 1970s.
But when the reforms are broader and more far-reach-
ing, computing costs becomes trickier. One also runs
into the problem that the losers should be compensat-
ed for the total present discounted value of future loss-
es, which may entail a large transfer and associated
large increases in public debt or large changes in cur-
rent taxes and transfers for other groups. 
It makes more sense to recast the issue in the follow-
ing way: are our labour market institutions and our
welfare states designed well enough so that the gains
from trade reform will be broadly shared? Or are they
likely to breed opposition to these reforms? 
Table 3.8 
Unemployment regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable:
Unemployment rate 1988-2003 1988-2003 1988-2003 1988-2003 1988-2003 1990-2003 1990-2003
Average replacement rate 0.094*** 0.079*** 0.085** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.016 0.104***
(4.55) (3.70) (2.36) (3.67) (3.67) (0.45) (2.84)
Tax wedge 0.259*** 0.252*** 0.075* 0.217*** 0.251*** 0.045 0.085
(8.77) (8.55) (1.68) (8.66) (8.34) (1.17) (1.61)
Union density 0.004 0.004 -0.298*** -0.002 0.004 -0.169** -0.329***
(0.16) (0.16) (3.94) (0.07) (0.16) (2.23) (3.82)
Employment protection  -0.319 -0.337 0.207 -0.565 -0.325 -0.194 0.306
(0.85) (0.91) (0.48) (1.51) (0.82) (0.44) (0.69)
Product market regulation 0.327 0.324 -0.055 0.473* 0.322 0.461 -0.008
(1.28) (1.29) (0.17) (1.96) (1.25) (1.46) (0.02)
Corporatism -2.280*** -2.290*** 0.000 -1.945*** -2.288*** 0.000 0.000
(4.89) (4.93) (0.000) (4.39) (4.90) (0.000) (0.000)
Output gap -0.474*** -0.485*** -0.564*** -0.479*** -0.485*** -0.580*** -0.572***
(13.51) (14.62) (8.04) (13.50) (14.53) (9.73) (7.54)
Total trade openness -0.071***
(6.00)










Imports from low-wage 











Outward FDI stock in low-








Observations 311 310 103 307 310 103 98
Time and country fixed 
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.71 0.80 0.73 0.71 0.84 0.81
Notes: t-values are given in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at
1 percent.We argue that rigidities such as employment protec-
tion and wage constraints, by reducing the economy’s
capacity to relocate labour to the sectors in which it
should specialise after opening up for more trade, are
poorly equipped to compensate the losers. Proactive
education and retraining policies look like obvious
remedies but may be more difficult to implement than
most people believe. We point out that the current
design of unemployment and welfare benefits is inad-
equate. Finally, we discuss what policies might be
most appropriate to ensure a fair sharing of the gains
from globalisation without at the same time causing
adverse effects on employment. 
7.1 The risks from rigid employment protection
The gains from trade are associated with greater spe-
cialisation to some sectors at the expense of others.
An economy exposed to more trade integration must
relocate labour from the sectors where it has a com-
parative disadvantage to those where it has a compar-
ative advantage. It is the role of the labour market to
perform such reallocation. Rigid employment protec-
tion both reduces the speed of job losses in contract-
ing sectors and makes employers in expanding sectors
less willing to hire. Hence, the reallocation process
becomes more sluggish. This reduces the gains from
trade, and allocates the gains and losses from globali-
sation in an uneven way. Essentially, workers in the
sectors that the country should abandon, instead of
relocating to the more profitable sectors, have to expe-
rience a large fall in wages or become unemployed,
depending on the wage formation mechanisms that
prevail. Labour immobility therefore creates a con-
stituency of workers who suffer from large wage loss-
es and are unlikely to be compensated as consumers
by the positive effects of cheaper imports. If instead
workers in contracting sectors could freely look for a





( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Dependent variable: Employment-
population ratio 1988-2003 1988-2003 1990-2003 1990-2003 1982-2003
Average replacement rate -0.074* -0.048 0.021 0.026 -0.073*
(1.85) (1.20) (0.37) (0.46) (1.71)
Tax wedge -0.233*** -0.221*** -0.031 0.050 -0.243***
(4.95) (4.69) (0.32) (0.48) (5.25)
Union density 0.052 0.054 0.466** 0.373* 0.102**
(1.30) (1.35) (2.44) (1.87) (2.05)
Employment protection  0.513 0.549 -0.170 -0.108 0.739
(1.00) (1.08) (0.14) (0.09) (1.24)
Product market regulation -0.531 -0.498 -0.553 -0.981 -0.586
(1.22) (1.17) (0.71) (1.26) (1.30)
Corporatism 0.609 0.634 0.000 0.000 0.634
(0.77) (0.81) (0.000) (0.000) (0.77)
Output gap 0.394*** 0.413*** 0.301*** 0.305*** 0.395***
(7.54) (8.11) (2.93) (3.12) (6.60)
Total trade openness -0.119**
(2.23)










Net outward FDI stock relative to GDP -0.030*
(1.76)
Outward FDI stock in low-wage





Observations 311 310 103 103 279
Time and country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.62
Notes: t-values are given in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent;
*** significant at 1 percent.EEAG Report 99
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moderately depressing effect on wages for the relevant
skill categories (including themselves) throughout the
economy and opposition to trade would be lower.45
Furthermore, it is now more likely that the workers
are compensated as consumers by the availability of
cheaper imports and as producers by the scale effects
of trade that we discussed in Section 4.1. 
For a country to adjust well to globalisation and to
reach a consensus on it, flexible labour markets that
make intersectoral job reallocation easy are impor-
tant. Some countries, such as the UK, do not have
many such barriers to mobility and have supported
globalisation. Other countries, such as France, have
numerous such barriers, due to strict employment
protection legislation, barriers to entry, regulated pro-
fessions, and so on. These countries have tried to
oppose globalisation. That leads us to our first rec-
ommendation: make labour markets more flexible by
eliminating barriers to intersectoral mobility!
It is well-known that the degree of employment pro-
tection does not seem to influence the overall employ-
ment level, a result that emerged also in our regres-
sions in Section 6.2.46 The explanation is that the
effects on employment of reductions in both job cre-
ation and job destruction more or less cancel out.
This is a likely reason for why low levels of employ-
ment protection are accepted in countries like the US,
the UK, Ireland and Denmark: the increased risks of
job loss are counterbalanced by increased rehiring
probabilities in the case of unemployment. But at the
same time, attempts to reduce employment protection
in a country usually meet with fierce political resis-
tance from employed insiders. 
An interesting attempt to reform employment protec-
tion is the Austrian model of decoupling severance
pay from the individual employer.47 According to this
model, the employer makes regular payments to a per-
sonalised account for each employee. Employees can
draw on this account in the case of dismissal. The
account is portable, that is it follows the employee
when changing employer, so mobility does not entail
a loss of accumulated rights to severance pay. Adopt-
ing a similar model in other EU countries with high
levels of employment protection would seem a rea-
sonable way of keeping (some) benefits from employ-
ment protection for insiders, at the same time as the
adverse effects on restructuring and mobility would
be reduced. Such reforms would also fit in with earli-
er proposals (for example in Chapter 2 of the 2004
EEAG report) of substituting more transparent sys-
tems of severance pay for uncertain, discretionary
court decisions in particularly Southern European
countries.
7.2 Wage rigidities and the welfare system 
A common feature of the welfare system in most
Western European countries is the high level of unem-
ployment benefits. It is often claimed that generous
unemployment insurance is necessary if wage earners
are to accept the structural changes associated with
globalisation. According to this argument, a more
rapid pace of the globalisation process would moti-
vate higher rather than lower unemployment benefits.
This would also serve as a way of compensating the
losers. However, such a policy would prevent the
potential gains from globalisation from being
realised. The reason is that generous unemployment
benefits reduce the willingness of the unemployed to
take up new jobs. As discussed in Section 3.4, the
“turbulence” brought about by globalisation is likely
to imply a faster reduction of the productivity of the
unemployed on a new job and hence of the wage that
employers would be willing to pay: the higher the ben-
efit level, the more likely is the reservation wage of the
unemployed to exceed the wage they can get on a new
job. This risk is particularly large if benefits are
indexed on previous wages. 
There are strong arguments for high unemployment
benefits during a limited period to help employees
cope with adjustment costs when becoming unem-
ployed. But generous unemployment benefits with a
long duration are not an appropriate instrument in
situations when labour needs to be reallocated
between sectors and jobs. Such benefits compensate
workers for being out of work but not for income loss-
es that could be suffered when taking up a new job. In
flexible labour markets, like those of the US and the
UK, being out of a job is a smaller risk than in Conti-
nental Europe, because unemployment duration is
much shorter. The real risk is then not joblessness but
the wage losses associated with worker displacement.
A number of studies have shown that these wage loss-
es are substantial.48 They reflect the devaluation of
workers’firm- and sector-specific human capital asso-
ciated with displacement. 
45 See Saint-Paul (2007) for a theoretical analysis. 
46 The relationship between employment protection and employment
was discussed at some length in Chapter 3 of the 2007 EEAG report. 
47 See, for example, European Commission (2007). 48 See, for example, Kletzer (2004) and OECD (2005).A similar risk results from the minimum wage
demands created by the subsistence minimum guaran-
tees that the welfare state provides. Minimum wages
and welfare payments impose a lower bound on the
wage distribution. The result is unemployment among
the less skilled strata of the population that results in
part from an excessive shrinkage of the labour-inten-
sive sectors of the economy. The labour-intensive sec-
tors that are most exposed to international low-wage
competition set capital, skilled labour and unskilled
labour free which then have to move to other sectors
of the economy. However, as those sectors operate in
a more capital and skill-intensive way than the shrink-
ing sectors, they cannot absorb all the unskilled work-
ers. Unemployment, overspecialisation and sluggish
growth result from this process if wages are prevented
from adjusting.
7.3 Useful reforms
We suggest that one should rethink our welfare sys-
tems in light of the considerations above. The philos-
ophy should be one of insuring people against losses
in the market value of their human capital, rather
than against their inability to transact in the labour
market. That latter problem would be considerably
alleviated by having more flexible labour markets,
which globalisation itself is likely to contribute to. But
more flexible labour markets would do nothing to
insure workers against wage losses due to the obsoles-
cence of part of their human capital. 
It is not obvious how to design appropriate insurance
schemes that could compensate the potential losers
from the globalisation process. But it is easy to point
to a number of possible components.
• Access to suitable retraining and  re-education of
displaced workers. This would appear to be the
most natural policy intervention, as it seeks direct-
ly to address the reallocation problem.
• Government support to displaced workers through
severance pay. The advantage of severance pay
compared to unemployment benefits is that the
money is paid upon separation and is thus inde-
pendent of the subsequent job search activity. At
the margin, the worker loses nothing from accept-
ing a job offer, contrary to what happens with a
system based on unemployment insurance. To pre-
vent firms and workers from colluding to use such
severance pay opportunistically by routinely laying
off individual workers, it could be restricted to
observable collective events such as plant closing,
massive layoffs, loss of profitability in the sector
where the firm is operating, or loss of jobs in the
worker’s occupation. 
•A   wage insurance such that upon taking a new job
with a lower pay than the previous job the govern-
ment will make up for part of the difference during
a specified length of time. The subsidy would be
paid to the displaced worker first upon receiving a
wage in a new job. Hence, wage insurance would
have no adverse effects on job search activity of the
unemployed: on the contrary, it should stimulate it
because it raises the pay-off from finding a job. 
• Employment income tax credits to low-wage earn-
ers in general as suggested in, for example, EEAG
(2002) of the type that are used extensively in the
US and the UK. Since the tax credit only applies to
income from work, this measure, too, strengthens
the job-finding incentives of the unemployed. 
All the measures suggested would help compensate
potential losers from the globalisation process.
Retraining/re-education, severance pay and wage
insurance target those who are likely to be the biggest
losers from restructuring: those who actually have to
move to new jobs and who therefore may face large
wage cuts. But these measures would not help com-
pensate those who stay on in jobs meeting declining
demand and who will also suffer wage losses
(although smaller). This is, however, the case with
employment income tax credits to the extent that
globalisation implies a relative shift in demand from
low-skilled to high-skilled, as this measure would
encompass all those with low wages. Because such
employment tax credits imply that government bene-
fits are paid out under the condition of working
rather than the reverse, the implicit minimum wage
resulting from the present Western European welfare
systems would be reduced. This would promote
employment. For this reason, employment tax credits
are a much more efficient way of compensating
potential losers from the globalisation process than
imposing legal minimum wages, which in most cases
raise unemployment. However, employment tax cred-
its for low-wage earners would not compensate those
groups of high-skilled, who could also be exposed to
declining demand, as discussed in Section 5.3. But one
might consider this a smaller problem than if low-
wage earners have to face lower wages.
Although all the policies suggested would be benefi-
cial as part of a compensation package for losers in
the globalisation process, they also have drawbacks. It
is easy to get everyone to agree on the desirability of
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retraining and re-education programmes. But in prac-
tice it has often proved difficult to get good results
from such programmes. To some extent this may have
been the consequence of too large programme vol-
umes and by the use of such programmes as qualify-
ing devices for unemployment benefits rather than as
stepping stones to jobs.49 But the difficulty of fore-
casting exactly what tasks are likely to be least
exposed to competition from low-wage economies
calls for caution. In a world where also some high-
skilled tasks can be outsourced, higher education in
general may not be a guarantee against large wage
losses. It has often been pointed out that ability to
adapt may be much more important than a high skill
level (for example, Baldwin 2007), but it is far from
clear how to teach such adaptability.
Special severance pay arrangements in the case of
large collective events has the drawback that it would
leave out many sources of job loss. It would also
involve complex design issues. Presumably, it would
have to imply a large amount of discretionary deci-
sion-making, which raises serious political-economy
issues of how the system could become subject to
lobbying from interest groups and used in an in-
equitable way.
Wage insurance has its drawbacks, too. It would be
more practical to implement than a discretionary sev-
erance pay system, but may lead to mismatch as work-
ers accept inappropriate jobs: wage insurance would
weaken the allocative role of wages in transmitting
proper signals about the relative social values of the
different jobs that the worker could have. 
The problem with general employment tax credits is
that they must be phased out at higher income levels
if they are to function as a compensation device for
low-wage earners. This means that marginal tax
rates increase in the phasing-out interval and reduce
work incentives there. Available empirical evidence
suggests that the employment gains at lower wage
levels (because participation in the labour force
increases and the number of employed persons rise
– the extensive margin) are likely to outweigh the
negative effect on hours worked for employees with
incomes in the phasing-out interval (the intensive
margin).50 However, the latter effects tend to become
larger the higher are marginal tax rates in that inter-
val to begin with and the more compressed is the
wage distribution.
There is a case for finding ways of compensating
losers from the globalisation process and to try to
ensure a fair sharing of the aggregate gains through
measures such as the ones discussed. At the same
time, pushing such attempts too far will entail large
costs. It cannot be the task of governments to provide
citizens with full insurance against all contingencies.
The globalisation process would seem to justify some
policy interventions to deal with its income distribu-
tion consequences, but one should be cautious not to
put much higher requirements on government policy
in this case than we want to do in other cases unless
we can clearly motivate why.
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